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Therapeutic jurisprudence, a broad and potentially all-encompassing concept, first appeared in mental health law and scholarly
literature and has been evolving and growing ever since. According to
Professor David Wexler, a leader of the therapeutic jurisprudence
movement, therapeutic jurisprudence "tries to eschew doctrinal niceties and symmetries in favor of looking at a problem and trying to
develop reasonably workable solutions."1 Therapeutic jurisprudence
is, he writes, "centrist"' and "leads us to probe beneath a rhetoric of
rights and to focus instead on needs and interests, all the while seeking
a creative convergence or compromise." 3 This approach to jurisprudence moves away from the "argument culture" that infuses the
adversarial system, in which the culture of critique, opposition, and
debate are preferred over a culture4 of dialogue, cooperation, and other
approaches of intellectual inquiry.
Therapeutic jurisprudence examines whether the law and legal
institutions have healing effects or detrimental effects. Therapeutic
jurisprudence proposes reforms that enable the legal system to focus
more on problem-solving without sacrificing the rule of law and the
principles that our legal system serves, such as predictability and
stability.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has, in recent months, come out of the
scholarly literature and become part of the everyday judicial lexicon.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has also become the subject of various judicial education programs. Chief justices of state courts speak enthusiastically about therapeutic courts, namely federally-funded drug
courts. The drug courts, labor-intensive and expensive, are charac*
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terized as problem-solving and community-oriented courts using
interdisciplinary knowledge and diverse professionals. Their goal: to
help eradicate drug addiction rather than imprison individuals who are
likely to reenter the criminal justice system on release from prison.
State court judges are also talking about creating mental health law
courts, using the drug courts as models.6
If therapeutic jurisprudence is so good, its applicability should
not be limited to the trial courts. This Article offers some examples of
how appellate courts can join the trial courts in applying therapeutic
jurisprudence, but it also raises some concerns.
Appellate practice is part of the adversarial system and the
"argument culture." 7 An appeal pits at least two sides against each
other and lets them slug it out in public. Yet appellate courts, like
trial courts, are concerned about the inappropriateness of the adversarial system, at least in certain settings.
Appellate judges are becoming more interested in alternatives to
the "argument culture"; they are increasingly interested in enabling
the parties to create solutions to complex problems in addition to
declaring rights and naming winners and losers. Appellate courts are
beginning to use mediation to resolve disputes. Ellen Waldman
describes mediation as "conflict resolution in a 'therapeutic key.'"
In a recent case, Gillen v. City of Neenah,9 the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the parties should be encouraged to resolve their differences themselves and to seek a creative
convergence or compromise instead of having a legal resolution thrust
upon them."° The case involved a dispute about water rights and the
construction and operation of a wastewater treatment plant. Multiple
parties were involved, including the state, local governments, associations of local governmental units, nongovernmental environmental
groups, the community, individuals, and corporate entities." These
parties were intimately familiar with the many aspects of this dispute
and might, in the future, be involved in matters relating to this wastewater treatment plant or other environmental matters.
("We are encouraging therapeutic court and restorative justice initiatives. We will monitor the
results. Only time will tell whether these movements become important permanent elements of
the administration of justice in Alaska.").
6. See id.
7. Wexler, supra note 1,at 263-67 (applying linguist Deborah Tannen's concept of the
system).
argument culture to our legal
8. Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-FacilitativeDebate in Mediation: Applying the Lens
of TherapeuticJurisprudence,82 MARQ. L. REV. 155,160 (1998).
9. 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998).
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11. Seeid. at630-31.
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After briefs were submitted and oral arguments heard, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court asked the parties to consider using negotiation and mediation to resolve their dispute, which involved a public
issue of widespread concern. The parties did not negotiate a settlement. Instead, they asked the court to proceed to a decision in the
case, which the court did.' 2 This attempt at seeking the mediation of
an issue that affected a whole community was not successful in that
case, but perhaps the court will be successful the next time.
The experience of the Wisconsin Supreme Court raises an interesting question of whether appellate courts can or should impose a
culture of dialogue on parties who seek resolution through adversarial
means. In any event, no criteria have been developed to determine
whether the therapeutic effect on disputants differs depending on
whether a third party (the court) makes the decision or the parties
engage in autonomous decision-making.' 3
As another example of therapeutic jurisprudence at the appellate
level, in 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court reached a decision that
4
encouraged community resolution of individual rights claims.
Although the Vermont Supreme Court declared that the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the benefits and
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law, the court did
not determine the method for extending those benefits and protections
to same-sex couples. 5 Instead, the court left to the legislature the task
of developing the method to be employed, whether it be inclusion
partnership system, or some
within the marriage laws, a domestic
16
alternative.
statutory
equivalent
The Vermont Supreme Court declared that it was not infringing
upon the prerogatives of the legislature to craft an appropriate means
of addressing the constitutional mandate.17 Furthermore, to avoid disruptive and unforeseen consequences, the court ruled that the current
statutory scheme would remain in effect for a reasonable time to
enable the legislature to consider and enact implementing legislation in
an orderly and expeditious fashion.'" The court explicitly acknowl-

12. See id. at 630 (reversing the judgment of the circuit court and remanding for further
proceedings).
13. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 160-61 (viewing the controversy between the evaluative
and facilitative modes of mediation through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence).
14. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
15. Seeid. at867.
16. See id.
17. Seeid. at886.
18. Seeid. at 887.
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edged that judicial authority is not ultimate authority and is not the
only repository of wisdom.19
The Vermont Supreme Court embraced the value of dialogue
and discussion as a means to reach an appropriate resolution of a difficult issue. After the court decision, the dialogue would be among the
legislators and the citizens of Vermont.
The Vermont Supreme Court interpreted and applied social
science research, recognized a wide range of participants and stakeholders, emphasized post-adjudicative dispute resolution, and encouraged a collaborative process to satisfy the interests at stake. "Courts
do best," wrote the Vermont Supreme Court, "by proceeding in a way
that is catalytic rather than preclusive, and that is closely attuned to
the fact that courts are participants in the system of democratic deliberation."2 Sounds like therapeutic jurisprudence to me!
Vermont Supreme Court Justice Denise Johnson disagreed with
this "therapeutic" type of remedy. She argued that because the court
properly found a constitutional violation, it should "simply enjoin the
State from denying marriage licenses to plaintiffs based on sex or sexual orientation."21 Justice Johnson contended that the majority's remedy misunderstood the proper roles played by the legislature and the
judiciary in a tripartite system of government. 2 She stated that "the
judiciary's obligation to remedy constitutional violations is central to
our form of government. "23 Justice Johnson concluded by asserting
her belief that the majority's mandate will "only increase the uncer24
tainty and confusion that the majority states it is designed to avoid."
Commentators variously heaped both praise and criticism on the
Vermont Supreme Court decision. The public and the political
branches of government-separately and together-engaged in discussions about appropriate legislation to respond to the supreme court
19. See id. at 888.
20. Id. (quoting C. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4,
101 (1996)).
21. Baker, 744 A.2d at 898 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 899-900.
24. Id. at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Justice Johnson's dissent
presents a critique of fashioning therapeutic remedies in cases involving constitutional rights.
She writes,
No decision of this Court will abate the moral and political debate over same-sex
marriage. My view as to the appropriateness of granting plaintiffs the license they
seek is not based on any overestimate (or any estimate) of its effectiveness, nor on a
miscalculation (or any calculation) as to its likely permanence, were it to have received
the support of a majority of this Court. Rather, it is based on what I believe are the
commands of our Constitution.
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decision. The Vermont legislature and the governor endorsed broad
public involvement in resolving this controversial issue. In keeping
with Vermont's tradition of town meetings, thousands of Vermont
residents appeared at public meetings to express their views.25
Individuals and groups from across the country set up shop in
Vermont to make their views known.26 The Vermont political
branches and the Vermont media did not welcome them. There was
"an atmosphere within Vermont that this is our issue and we will
resolve it. And27 outsiders .... thank you very much, but why don't
you go skiing?"
Although both the people and the legislative bodies of Vermont
were deeply divided, the debates were characterized as civil and the
participants as well-behaved.28 On April 26, 2000, both houses of the
legislature adopted a law creating "civil unions" for same-sex couples,
sending the bill to Governor Howard Dean. 29 The Governor signed
the legislation on the same day he received it, out of media view.
Governor Dean stated that "he signed the bill privately because he did
not want the ceremony to be a triumphal party by supporters of the
law. Instead, he said it was time for the state to begin the healing."'3
Both the Vermont Supreme Court's approach in Baker v. Vermont and the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence raise important
questions about the relationship among the branches of government
and the institutional competence of each, as well as the judiciary's
relation with the public. More attention needs to be paid in evaluating
the areas in which therapeutic jurisprudence can be effectively applied.
Professor Wexler says that dialogue-producing doctrines like therapeutic jurisprudence are likely to be helpful.31 We'll see whether that
prediction proves correct in Vermont.
A New York Times article detailed how the Vermont legislators
who voted to approve marriage-like civil unions for gay couples wondered whether the vote would be one of their last as elected officials.32
25. See Elaine Stuart, Book Review, 73 SPECTRUM 28 (2000) (Reviewing WILLIAM
DOYLE, THE VERMONT POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THOSE WHO HELPED MAKE IT

(1998)).
26. Carey Goldberg, Forced into Action on Gay Marriage, Vermont Finds Itself Deeply Split,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A16.
27. Id. (quoting Stephen Kiernen, Burlington Free Presseditorial page editor).
28. Id.
29. Ross Sneyd, Vermont Governor Signs Gay Union Law, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 27, 2000, at 2.
30. Id. The Governor is quoted saying, "In politics, bill-signings are triumphal. They
represent overcoming of one side over another. These celebrations, as the subject matter of the
bill, will be private." Id. Some Vermont lawmakers, however, were disappointed that no public
ceremony marked the adoption of this historical legislation.
31. See Wexler, supra note 1, at 264-67.
32. Carey Goldberg, Vermont Senate Votes for Gay Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
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Senator Peter E. Shulmin, president pro tern of the Vermont Senate,
was quoted as saying, "You see senators in tears .... I've never seen a
vote that required more courage., 33 The pundits watched to see how
legislators, both proponents and opponents of any law enacted in
response to the Vermont Supreme Court's decision, would be received
by the electorate in the 2000 fall elections and how the public would
react to the new law. The jury, as we say, is still out on the Vermont
Supreme Court's application of the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence in appellate decision-making.

2000, at A12.
33. Id.

